Floyd-Hoare Logic & Verification Conditions

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April 16, 2013

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A Small Imperative Language

data Var

data Exp

data Pred

A Small Imperative Language

```
data Com = Asgn Var Expr
| Seq Com Com
| If Exp Com Com
| While Pred Exp Com
| Skip
```

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Verification Condition Generation

Use the State monad to log individual loop invariant requirements

type VC = State [Pred] -- validity queries for SMT solver

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Top Level Verification Function

The top level verifier, takes:

Input : precondition p, command c andpostcondition q

 \blacktriangleright **Output** : True iff $\{p\}$ c $\{q\}$ is a valid Hoare-Triple

verify :: Pred -> Com -> Pred -> Bool

verify p c q = all smtValid queries
where
 (q', conds) = runState (vcgen q c) []
 queries = p 'implies' q' : conds

```
Verification Condition Generator
   vcgen :: Pred -> Com -> VC Pred
   vcgen (Skip) q
     = return q
   vcgen (Asgn x e) q
     = return $ q 'subst' (x, e)
   vcgen (Seq s1 s2) q
     = vcgen s1 =<< vcgen s2 q
   vcgen (If b c1 c2) q
     = do q1 <- vcgen c1 q
          q2 <- vcgen c2 q
          return $ (b 'implies' q1) 'And' (Not b 'implies' q2)
   vcgen (While i b c) q
     = do q' <- vcgen c i
          sideCondition $ (i 'And' b) 'implies' q'
          sideCondition $ (i 'And' Not b) 'implies' q
          return $ i
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```

vcgen Helper Logs All Side Conditions

```
sideCond :: Pred -> VC ()
sideCond p = modify  \ conds \rightarrow p : conds
```

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Next: Some Examples

Now, lets use the above verifier to check some programs

Consider the program c defined:

```
while (x > 0) {
    x = x - 1;
    y = y - 2;
}
```

Lets prove that

 ${x==8 \&\& y==16} c {y == 0}$

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Add the pre- and post-condition with assume and assert

```
assume(x == 8 && y == 16);
while (x > 0) {
    x = x - 1;
    y = y - 2;
}
assert(y == 0);
```

What do we need next?

Lets use a *placeholder* I for the invariant

```
assume(x == 8 && y == 16);
while (x > 0) {
    invariant(I);
    x = x - 1;
    y = y - 2;
}
assert(y == 0);
```

Question: What should I be?

- 1. Weak enough to hold *initially*
- 2. Inductive to prove preservation

3. Strong enough to prove goal

Lets try the candidate invariant y == 2 * x

```
assume(x == 8 && y == 16);
while (x > 0) {
    invariant(y == 2 * x);
    x = x - 1;
    y = y - 2;
}
assert(y == 0);
```

1. Holds initially?

SMT-Valid (x == 8 && y == 16) => (y == 2 * x) ?
[Yes]

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Lets try the candidate invariant y == 2 * x

```
assume(x == 8 && y == 16);
while (x > 0) {
    invariant(y == 2 * x);
    x = x - 1;
    y = y - 2;
}
assert(y == 0);
```

- 2. Preserved ?
 - SMT-Valid (y = 2 * x && x > 0) => (y-2 == 2 * (x 1)) ?
 [Yes]

Lets try the candidate invariant y == 2 * x

```
assume(x == 8 && y == 16);
while (x > 0) {
    invariant(y == 2 * x);
    x = x - 1;
    y = y - 2;
}
assert(y == 0);
```

- 3. Strong Enough To Prove Goal?
 - SMT-Valid (y = 2 * x && !x > 0) => (y == 0) ?
 [No]

Uh oh. Close, but no cigar...

Example 1: Adding A Loop Invariant (Take 2) Lets try (y == 2 * x) && (x >=0) assume(x == 8 && y == 16); while (x > 0) { invariant(y == 2 * x && x >= 0); x = x - 1;y = y - 2;} assert(y == 0);SMT Valid Check 1. Initial (x == 8 & y == 16) => (y == 2 * x) Yes 2. Preserve (y = 2 * x && x > 0) => (y-2 == 2 * (x - 1))1)) Yes 3. Goal $(y = 2 * x \&\& x \ge 0 \&\& !x \ge 0) => (y == 0)$ Yes ▲ロト ▲帰 ト ▲ ヨ ト ▲ ヨ ト ・ ヨ ・ の Q ()

```
assume(n > 0);
var k = 0;
var r = 0;
var s = 1;
while (k != n) {
  invariant(I);
  r = r + s;
  s = s + 2;
  k = k + 1;
}
assert(r == n * n);
```

Whoa! What's a reasonable invariant I?

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Lets try the obvious thing ... r == k * k

```
assume(n > 0);
var k = 0;
var r = 0;
var s = 1;
while (k != n) {
  invariant(r == k * k);
  r = r + s;
  s = s + 2;
 k = k + 1;
}
assert(r == n * n);
  Initial (k == 0 && r == 0) => (r == k * k) YES
  • Goal (r == k * k \&\& k == n) => (r == n * n) YES
```

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Finding an invariant that is **preserved** can be tricky....

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- ... typically need to strengthen to get preservation
- ... that is, to add extra conjuncts

Example 2: Take 2

Strengthen I with facts about s

```
assume(n > 0);
var k = 0;
var r = 0;
var s = 1;
while (k != n) {
  invariant(r == k*k \&\& s == 2*k + 1);
  r = r + s;
  s = s + 2;
 k = k + 1;
}
assert(r == n * n);
```

1. Initial

> (k == 0 && r == 0 && s==1) => (r == k*k && s == 2*k + 1)
 > YES

Example 2: Take 2

Strengthen I with facts about s

```
assume(n > 0);
var k = 0;
var r = 0;
var s = 1;
while (k != n) {
  invariant(r == k*k \&\& s == 2*k + 1);
  r = r + s;
  s = s + 2;
 k = k + 1;
}
assert(r == n * n);
 2. Goal
  ▶ (r == k*k && s == 2*k + 1 && k == n) => (r ==
```

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n*n)

YES

Example 2: Take 2

Strengthen I with facts about s

```
assume(n > 0);
var k = 0;
var r = 0;
var s = 1;
while (k != n) {
  invariant(r == k*k && s == 2*k + 1);
  r = r + s;
  s = s + 2;
 k = k + 1;
}
assert(r == n * n);
 3. Preserve
```

(r == k * k && s == 2 * k + 1 && k != n)=> (r + s == (k+1) * (k+1) && s+2 == 2 * (k+1) + 1)

Adding Features To IMP

Functions

Pointers

IMP + Functions

```
data Fun = F String [Var] Com
```

```
data Com = ...
| Call Var Fun [Expr]
| Return Expr
```

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data Pgm = [Fun]

IMP + Functions

A function is a big sequence of ${\tt Com}$ which does not modify formals

```
function f(x1,...,xn){
  requires(pre);
  ensures(post);
  body;
  return e;
}
```

Precondition

- Predicate over the formal parameters x1,...,xn
- That records assumption about inputs

Postcondition

- Predicate over the formals and return value \$result
- ► That records assertion about outputs (□) (□) (□) (□) (□)

Modular Verification With Contracts

- Together, pre- and post- conditions called contracts
- ► We can generate VC (hence, verify) one-function-at-a-time

Using just contracts for all called functions

Questions

- 1. How to verify *each* function with *callee* contracts?
- 2. How to verify Call commands?

Verifying A Single Function

To verify a single function

```
function f(x1,...,xn){
  requires(pre);
  ensures(post);
  body;
  return e;
}
```

we need to just verify the Hoare-triple

```
{pre} body ; $result := r {post}
```

Exercise How will you handle return sprinkled within body ?

Verifying A Single Call Command

To establish a Hoare-triple for a single call command

We must guarantee that pre (of f) holds *before* the call
 We can assume that post (off') holds *after* the call

Hence, the above triple reduces to verifying that

```
{P}
    assert (pre[e1/x1,...,en/xn]) ;
    assume (post[e1/x1,...,en/xn, tmp/$result];
    y := tmp;
{Q}
```

where tmp is a fresh temporary variable.

Caller-Callee Contract Duality

Note that at the **callsite** for a function, we

- assert the pre-condition
- assume the post-condition

while when checking the callee we

- assume the pre-condition
- assert the post-condition

This is key for modular verification

 Breaks verification up into pieces matching function abstraction

Consider a function

where we want to verify

```
assume(sorted(arr));
y = binarySearch(arr, 12);
if (y != -1){
   assert (arr[y] == 12)
   ...
```


Example: Precondition VC

Consider a function

Replace call with assert and assume

//pre[arr/a, 12/v]
assert(sorted(arr));

Example: A Locking Protocol



"An attempt to re-acquire an acquired lock or release a released lock will cause a **deadlock**."

Figure: Calls to lock and unlock Must Alternate

Example: A Locking Protocol

The lock and unlock functions

```
function lock(1){
  assert(l == 0); //UNLOCKED
  return 1; //LOCKED
}
```

```
function unlock(l){
  assert(l == 1); //UNLOCKED
  return 0; //LOCKED
}
```

State of lock encoded in value

What are the **contracts** ? Pretty easy...

Example: A Locking Protocol

The lock and unlock functions with contracts

```
function lock(1){
  requires(1 == 0);
  ensures($result == 1);
```

```
assert(1 == 0); //UNLOCKED
return 1; //LOCKED
```

```
function unlock(1){
  requires(1 == 1);
  ensures($result == 0);
```

```
assert(l == 1); //UNLOCKED
return 0; //LOCKED
```

Example: Lock Verification

To verify this program

```
assume(1 == 0);
if (n % 2 == 0) {
    1 = lock(1);
}
...
if (n % 2 == 0) {
    1 = unlock(1);
}
```

we just verify

```
assume(l == 0);
if (n % 2 == 0) {
  assert(l == 0);
  assume(tmpa == 1);
  l = tmpa;
}
```

Adding Features To IMP

- Functions
- Pointers

Let us add references to IMP data Com = Deref Var Var -- x := *y DerefAsgn Var Expr -- *x := e

We find that our assignment rule does not work with aliasing

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As *x and *y are aliased, the following is valid

$$\{x == y\}$$
 $*x = 5$ $\{*x + *y == 10\}$

In general, for what P is the following valid?

$$\{P\} \qquad *x = 5 \qquad \{*x + *y == 10\}$$

Intuitively, P is something like

- In the first case, the two sum upto 10.
- In the second case, the aliasing kicks in.

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In general, for what P is the following valid?

$$\{P\} \quad *x = 5 \quad \{*x + *y == 10\}$$

But the Hoare-rule gives us

(*x + *y == 10)[5 / *x] == (5 + *y == 10) == (*y == 5)

Uh oh! We lost one case! What happened?!

The substitution [e/x] only works when

▶ x is the **only** representation for the value in the predicate

Here, there were two possible representations

- ► *x
- ► *y

and we say possible because it depends on the aliasing.

This is why aliasing is tricky

Verification With References

Key idea

Beef up our logic to handle memory as a monolithic entity

- 1. Extend logic theory (and SMT solver)
- 2. Extend Hoare-Rule

Note: Classical solution due to McCarthy

It has its issues but thats another story...

A Logic For Modelling References

- 1. Memory Variables M :: Mem
- 2. Select Operator for reading memory sel
- 3. Update Operator for writing memory upd
- 4. Axioms for reasoning about sel and upd

```
forall M, A1, A2, V.
    A1 == A2 => sel(upd(M, A1, V), A2) == V
```

```
forall M, A1, A2, V.
    A1 /= A2 => sel(upd(M, A1, V), A2) == sel(M, A2)
```

Updated Hoare-Rule for References

New rule for deref-read

{B [sel(M,y)/x]} x := *y {B}

New rule for deref-write

$$\{B [upd(M,x,e)/M]\} *x := e \{B\}$$

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Assignments and Aliasing Revisited

In general, for what P is the following valid?

$$\{P\} \quad *x = 5 \quad \{*x + *y == 10\}$$

Or rather,

$$\{P\}$$
 *x = 5 $\{sel(M,x) + sel(M,y) == 10\}$

Now, with the new deref-write rule P becomes

Which is exactly what we wanted!

Deductive Verifiers

We have just scratched the surface

Many industrial strength verifiers for real languages

- ► Why3
- ESC-Java

And these, which you can play with online

- VCC
- ▶ Spec# 1 Spec# 2
- Verifast

All very impressive: Try them out and see!

Main hassle: writing invariants, pre and post...